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ALL OF THE PRODUCTS, NONE OF THE LIABILITY:
EXAMINING THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO’S DECISION IN
STINER V. AMAZON.COM, INC.
Danny O’Connor

I. INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-seven years since Jeff Bezos launched Amazon out of his
garage, the company has evolved into a retail behemoth of unprecedented
magnitude. According to a 2019 survey analyzing the behaviors of over
2,000 Amazon customers, the company has captured 52.4% of the total
e-commerce market in the United States, with all signs indicating that
number will continue to rise in future years.1 In September 2019 alone,
over 150 million consumers in the United States accessed Amazon’s
mobile shopping app, nearly twice as many as the second most used
Walmart app.2 In the world of retail commerce, and certainly in the United
States, Amazon is a ubiquitous presence.
But what happens when a product purchased on Amazon’s online
marketplace injures or even kills a customer? Which entity does the
bereaved consumer sue for redress? The answer to these questions largely
depends on the state in which the injury occurs. In Ohio, the only clear
answer is that liability does not fall on Amazon.
In October 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio dealt a decisive blow to a
plaintiff seeking to hold Amazon liable under the state’s products liability
statute in its decision in Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc.3 The state’s high court
held that Amazon was not a “supplier” as defined by the Ohio Product
Liability Act and therefore could not be held liable for the death of
plaintiff’s 18-year-old son.4 This outcome placed Ohio squarely on the
side of several other state and federal courts that have declined to hold
Amazon liable for injuries caused by products sold on its online
marketplace by third-party vendors. By doing so, the court effectively
shielded the company from the reach of products liability law.
This Note examines the ramifications of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
decision in Stiner and compares the majority’s approach with those taken
by other federal and state courts. Part II of this Note examines the

1. FEEDVISOR, THE 2019 AMAZON CONSUMER BEHAVIOR REPORT (2019),
https://fv.feedvisor.com/rs/656-BMZ-780/images/Feedvisor-Consumer-Survey-2019.pdf.
2. Most Popular Mobile Shopping Apps in the United States as of September 2019, STATISTA
(Sept. 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/579718/most-popular-us-shopping-apps-ranked-byaudience/.
3. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 394 (Ohio 2020).
4. Id. at 396.
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common law development of products liability in Ohio, culminating in
the passage of the Ohio Product Liability Act.5 Finally, Part II examines
the federal and state court opinions that represent a major divide in
characterizing Amazon’s role in the modern retail market. Part III argues
that the Supreme Court of Ohio did not sufficiently account for the
primary policy goals of products liability law and effectively barred Ohio
consumers from seeking legal redress when harmed by a defective
product bought from a third-party vendor on Amazon’s online
marketplace. Part III will also analyze the approaches taken by California
courts to demonstrate the Supreme Court of Ohio’s pointed reliance on
statutory interpretation ran contrary to the objective of protecting Ohio
consumers from the pitfalls of the modern retail marketplace. Part III
concludes by demonstrating that the express language of the OPLA, in
conjunction with Ohio common law, provides a sufficient mechanism
through which Amazon can be found liable for injuries caused by thirdparty vendor products. Part IV concludes by assessing the current
landscape of products liability law in the twenty-first century and
reasserting the need for the Supreme Court of Ohio to play a more active
role in providing legal protection to injured Ohio consumers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Products Liability Law in Ohio
Prior to the twentieth century, and well before the formal recognition
of a distinct products liability doctrine in Ohio, numerous forms of action,
based on theories of negligence and breach of warranty, existed to provide
consumers legal relief for injuries caused by defective products.6 In the
early twentieth century, the seminal decision in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. led to a nationwide evolution in products liability law.7 In
MacPherson, the plaintiff was injured after his Buick’s tires broke down,
launching him from the vehicle.8 The New York Court of Appeals
disposed of the old common law rule that required contractual privity
between a consumer and manufacturer as a prerequisite to bringing a tort
action against the manufacturer of a defective product.9 Writing for the
majority, Judge Cardozo opined that the manufacturer of a chattel that is
5. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.71-2307.80.
6. Stephen J. Werber, An Overview of Ohio Product Liability Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 379,
382 (1995).
7. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
8. Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (1916).
9. Id. at 1054.
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“inherently dangerous” is strictly liable for injuries caused by that
chattel.10 Throughout the next several decades, many states followed New
York’s lead and began carving out a separate doctrine for addressing
injuries suffered by consumers at the hands of negligent manufacturers.
Ohio went a step further when it recognized the first semblance of its
own products liability doctrine in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision
in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.11 The case arose from plaintiff’s
hair suffering severe damage after using a home permanent set sold by
defendant.12 The court held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of
action sounded in both negligence and breach of express warranty.13
Significantly, the court also held that contractual privity did not need to
exist for an injured consumer to pursue a cause of action against the
manufacturer of a defective and not inherently dangerous product, paving
the way for such actions to arise exclusively in tort.14 Twenty years later,
the court fully eliminated any requirement of contractual privity for tortbased strict liability against manufacturer-sellers by adopting the requisite
provision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.15
In January 1988, the Ohio General Assembly passed the Ohio Product
Liability Act (OPLA).16 The OPLA transformed products liability relief
into a statutorily derived cause of action.17 At the time of its passage, the
OPLA effectively served as a codification of common law principles,18
creating four theories of relief that had previously received judicial
recognition: injuries caused by defects in manufacture or construction;19
design or formulation defects;20 defects in warning or instructions;21 and
failure to conform to representation.22 The OPLA was amended in 2005
to clarify that §§ 2307.71 through 2307.80 “are intended to abrogate all

10. Id. at 1055.
11. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 613 (Ohio 1958).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 616.
14. Id. (The Court also commented on the relationship between the manufacturer of the product
and the retailer that ultimately sells the product to the consumer: “…Many of these manufactured articles
are shipped out in sealed containers by the manufacturer, and the retailers who dispense them to the
ultimate consumers are but conduits through which the manufacturer distributes his goods. The consuming
public ordinarily relies exclusively on the representations of the manufacturer in his advertisements.” Id.
at 615.).
15. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977).
16. Werber, supra note 6, at 382.
17. Id. at 382-83.
18. Id.
19. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.74.
20. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.75.
21. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.76.
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.77.
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common law product liability claims or causes of action.”23
By creating its own products liability doctrine in Rogers and almost
thirty years later codifying the common law principles in the OPLA, Ohio
signaled that it will not expect plaintiffs to bear the burden of their own
injuries when manufacturers who distribute dangerous and faulty
products are the appropriate party to brace responsibility for such harms.
Almost thirty-five years after passage of the OPLA, this practice is
complicated by globalized and modern e-commerce.
B. New Products Produce Competing Approaches to
Amazon’s Liability in the Modern Context
Amazon’s business model defies characterization of its role in
distributing products to customers through traditional retail industry
labels such as “manufacturer,” “seller,” or “distributor.” Much of the
success of Amazon’s online marketplace is driven by the myriad thirdparty vendors that list products on its site. According to Forbes, more than
half of all products bought and sold through Amazon’s marketplace come
from third-party vendors.24
When third-party vendors elect to list and sell their products on
Amazon’s online marketplace, they are required to consent to the Amazon
Business Solutions Agreement (BSA). The BSA provides numerous
requirements that effectively distance Amazon from its third-party
vendors. Such vendors are required to “source, offer, sell, and fulfill” the
products they sell on the online marketplace.25 The vendor is responsible
for any non-conformity or defect in its product;26 the vendor provides a
product description to the buyer;27 and the vendor is responsible for
proper packaging of the product and ensuring that it complies with all
applicable laws.28
The vendor may also elect to utilize Amazon’s “Fulfillment by
Amazon” program.29 This program allows vendors to store their
inventory in one of Amazon’s fulfillment centers.30 Amazon then

23. OHIO REV. CODE. § 2307.71(B).
24. Pamela Danzinger, Thinking Of Selling On Amazon Marketplace? Here Are The Pros And
Cons, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2018/04/27/prosand-cons-of-amazon-marketplace-for-small-and-mid-sized-businesses/?sh=4a6c11996867.
25. Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement, https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help
/external/G1791?language=en_US (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
26. Id. at § S-3.1.
27. Id. at § S-11.
28. Id. at § S-1.1.
29. Id. at §§ F-1-F-5.
30. Id.
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packages and ships the product to the customer on the vendor’s behalf.31
In lieu of utilizing Amazon’s logistics services, the vendor is responsible
for holding its own inventory before it personally ships it to the buyer.32
Many of these vendors note the ease Amazon provides in getting their
products listed and sold, making it an ideal choice for many small and
medium-sized businesses to reach potential customers.33 The proliferation
of these third-party vendors, however, has raised questions about whether
Amazon should be on the hook for injuries caused by third-party vendors’
products.
One product in particular, the “hovering scooter,” has drawn Amazon
into extensive product liability litigation.34 After enjoying a major surge
of popularity during the 2015 holiday season, a string of explosions
quickly led to nearly 500,000 scooter recalls across the United States by
the Consumer Product Safety Commission.35 The injured plaintiffs’
ensuing claims produced varying approaches to classifying Amazon’s
role in the transactions that occur on its online marketplace.
Subparts 1 and 2 will discuss key holdings where the courts declined
to extend liability to Amazon for such transactions. Subpart 3 will discuss
the multiple approaches employed by the California Second District
Court of Appeals for imposing liability on Amazon.
1. Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc.
Two federal cases in 2019 signaled a possible trend that Amazon would
enjoy broad immunity for the faulty products sold by its third-party
vendors. The first major case originated in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois when a hoverboard, purchased through
Amazon’s online marketplace, caught fire in the plaintiffs’ home and
caused serious damage.36 At summary judgment proceedings, the court
closely examined the parameters of Amazon’s BSA to determine the
extent to which Amazon directly participated in the sale of the scooter.37
Applying Illinois law, the court relied on the Restatement (Second) of
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 2.1.
33. Id. (“Getting started is certainly easier than setting up your own website and warehousing
infrastructure. Create your product listing, send inventory to an FBA (Fulfillment by Amazon) warehouse,
and you are in business.”).
34. Brad Stone, Amazon’s Marketplace Could Be Forever Changed by One Exploding
Hoverboard, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2021, 6:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/newsletters/2021-05-10/amazon-exploding-hoverboard-case-could-forever-change-company.
35. Camila Domonoske, Half A Million ‘Hooverboards’ Recalled Over Risk Of Fire, Explosions,
NPR (Jul. 6, 2016, 6:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/06/484988211/half-amillion-hoverboards-recalled-over-risk-of-fire-explosions.
36. Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d 766 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
37. Id. at 771.
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Torts to advance two alternative arguments for declining to hold Amazon
liable for the exploding scooter.38 First, the court found that Amazon did
not manufacture, supply, sell, or otherwise distribute the product in
question, thus placing it outside of the “distributive chain,” within which
it would otherwise be liable.39 The court next found that Amazon may
still be liable, despite being outside the product’s distributive chain, if it
played “…an integral role in the marketing enterprise of an allegedly
defective product and participat[ed] in the profits derived from placing
the product in the stream of commerce.”40 Utilizing this standard, the
court predicted that the Illinois Supreme Court would find no facts in
dispute that could establish grounds for extending liability to Amazon.
The majority emphasized that the third-party vendor set the price for the
product, decided which warning labels to place on it, and transferred title
to the buyers.41 Additionally, it identified that Amazon had not assumed
a duty to warn the plaintiffs that the scooter might be defective.42
Accordingly, the court granted Amazon’s motion for summary
judgment.43 In doing so, the Northern District of Illinois effectively
concluded that the state’s common law did not provide a sufficient basis
for extending liability to Amazon for injuries caused by third-party
vendor products sold on its marketplace.44
2. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc.
A few months after Garber, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit considered an appeal presenting largely the same factual scenario.
In Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., the plaintiff purchased a hoverboard supplied
by the vendor W2M Trading Corp. from Amazon’s online marketplace.45
The lithium batteries in the hoverboard caught fire inside the plaintiff’s
home, resulting in severe injuries to the plaintiff and members of her
family. Their home and most of their personal belongings were
destroyed.46
38. Id. at 775.
39. Id. at 776. The court also outright dismissed plaintiffs contention that Amazon and its thirdparty vendor acted as “co-sellers” of the hoverboard.
40. Id. at 778-79.
41. Id. at 773 (the court also noted that the vendor did not utilize Amazon’s fulfillment program,
and thus Amazon never handled the product in any capacity other than processing the customer’s
payment).
42. Id. at 782.
43. Id. (the court did note it was undisputed that Amazon derived an economic benefit from the
sale of the hoverboard, and thus “participated in the profits” of placing it in the stream of commerce, but
nonetheless declined to hold them liable).
44. Id. at 781.
45. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2019).
46. Id.
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The linchpin of the court’s analysis was the meaning of the word
“seller.” The Sixth Circuit highlighted that under the Tennessee Products
Liability Act (TPLA), a seller of a product is “any individual or entity
engaged in the business of selling a product, including a retailer,
wholesaler, or distributor, as well as a ‘lessor’ engaged in the business of
leasing a product and a ‘bailor’ engaged in the business of bailment of a
product.”47 The plaintiff urged an expansive interpretation of this
provision, to which the court initially signaled its agreement.48 While the
court noted that Amazon was clearly the better positioned entity to
compensate plaintiff for her extensive injuries, as W2M was judgment
proof, it ultimately held that even an expansive interpretation of “seller”
did not apply to Amazon under these facts.49 The court ruled that Amazon
did not exercise sufficient control over the hoverboard to have “sold” it
to the plaintiff. Upon review of the factual record, the majority
highlighted that Amazon did not choose to offer the hoverboard for sale,
set its price, nor make any representations concerning the safety or
specifications of the hoverboard on its online marketplace.50 Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment ruling.51 By
doing so, the Sixth Circuit signaled that Amazon’s degree of control over
the products sold by its third-party vendors was crucial to the analysis of
product liability claims brought against the company.
3. Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC
About a year after the decision in Fox, the California Second District
Court of Appeals employed a sharply different approach against Amazon.
Once again, the item in question was a hoverboard with exploding
batteries. In 2015, the plaintiff bought a hoverboard on Amazon’s online
marketplace. The hoverboard was supplied by a third-party vendor called
TurnUpUp, a brand name used by a Chinese-based company called
SMILETO.52 The plaintiff gifted the hoverboard to her son for Christmas
and, about a week later, the hoverboard caught fire inside the plaintiff’s
home while plugged into an electrical-outlet.53 The plaintiff suffered
severe burns to her hands and feet in her effort to put out the blaze.54
In holding Amazon liable for the defective hoverboard, the court

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 422.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 772 (2021).
Id.
Id.
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accorded much weight to Amazon having known that a significant
number of potentially dangerous and defective hoverboard products had
been purchased through its marketplace during the 2015 holiday season.55
Additionally, the court found no favor with Amazon’s reliance on the
Uniform Commercial Code’s limited definitions of “seller,”56 which the
company cited to argue that it had not sufficiently participated in the
transaction to incur liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.57 The court
reasoned that products liability doctrine was a judicially created device to
protect consumers in an ever-evolving marketplace.58 As such, the court
found its scope could be expanded as needed to account for unique
business entities like Amazon.59
Next, relying on an extensive body of common law, the court advanced
two theories upon which Amazon could be found liable for injuries caused
by products sold on its marketplace by third parties.60 The first focused
on Amazon’s role in the “vertical chain of distribution.”61 The court
reasoned that, under this theory, Amazon placed itself squarely between
TurnUpUp and the plaintiff throughout the entire course of their
transaction.62 Amazon had served as a conduit for payment and
communication with the customer and collected significant fees from the
ultimate sale.63 Accordingly, Amazon was a direct link in the vertical
chain of distribution such that it could incur liability under California’s
strict products liability doctrine.64
The court further held that Amazon could be found liable under the
“stream of commerce” theory of products liability.65 Under this approach,
“no precise legal relationship” between Amazon and its third-party sellers
would be required to impose liability.66 Rather, the court focused on “the
defendant’s participatory connection, for his personal profit or other
benefit, with the injury-producing product and the enterprise that created
consumer demand for and reliance upon the product.”67 The court held
55. Id. at 774 (according to the court, over 380,000 hoverboards were purchased through
Amazon’s online marketplace in 2015, the vast majority of them supplied by third-party vendors).
56. U.C.C. § 2-103 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994). “Seller” means a person who sells
or contracts to sell goods.
57. Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 778-79.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 779.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 780 (the court firmly rejected Amazon’s assertion that it was nothing more than an online
storefront for TurnUpUp to sell its wares).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 781.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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that Amazon could be found liable under this approach because it received
a direct financial benefit from the sale of the hoverboard, played an
integral role in bringing the product to the consumer market, and had the
ability to influence the manufacturing and distribution process under the
BSA.68
As evidenced in these starkly different approaches to determining
Amazon’s liability for faulty products distributed by third-party vendors
on its online marketplace, courts tend to emphasize statutory meanings of
“seller,” “distributor,” and the like, and Amazon’s role in issuing these
products. Though Amazon remains the same platform with the same
relative involvement in each sale for third-party vendors, courts tend to
disagree on the characterization of these important considerations. As the
next Section demonstrates, Ohio tends to side with the Garber and Fox
courts in holding Amazon is too far removed from the distribution process
to be held liable for dangerous products sold by third-party vendors on its
platform.
C. Pure Caffeine Powder and the Ohio Approach
Amazon plays a substantial role in Ohio’s retail market. One source
estimated that, in 2018 alone, Amazon collected approximately $310
million dollars in sales taxes, all of which will be directly paid back to the
state of Ohio.69 Put another way, if Amazon conducted zero business in
Ohio, the statewide sales tax rate would have to be increased from 5.75%
to 5.95% to make up for the lost revenue.70 As is the case in most of the
United States, Amazon facilitates sales of an innumerable amount of
products to Ohio consumers.
In May of 2014, a series of tragic events thrust Ohio into the Amazon
product liability debate. Logan Stiner, an 18-year-old high school student
from Lorain County, was found dead in his home by his brother.71 The
county coroner later determined he died from irregular heartbeat and
seizures induced by consuming a lethal dose of pure caffeine-powder.72
Logan apparently obtained the caffeine powder from a friend (identified
throughout the case literature as “K.K.”) who purchased the powder,
branded as a pre-workout product, from Amazon’s online marketplace.
68. Id.
69. Rich Exner, Amazon’s huge impact on Ohio’s sales tax base: Numbers Behind the News,
CLEVELAND.COM (June 4, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/2019/06/amazons-hugeimpact-on-ohios-sales-tax-base-numbers-behind-the-news.html.
70. Id.
71. Kristin Anderson, Caffeine overdose ruled cause of prom king’s death, USA TODAY (Jul. 1,
2014, 8:20 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/07/01/caffeine-overdoseprom-king/11863631/.
72. Id.
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The powder was sold by a third-party vendor, incorporated in Arizona,
called Tenkoris.73 Several months after Stiner’s death, Amazon removed
caffeine-powder listings from its online marketplace in response to an
FDA advisory warning to consumers about the dangers of pure caffeinepowder products.74
Shortly after his death, Logan’s father brought causes of action against
Amazon, various Amazon affiliates, Tenkoris, and several other
companies involved in the manufacturing and shipping of the caffeine
product.75 Mr. Stiner originally asserted 12 causes of action, all of which
were later dropped, except for his causes of action against Amazon under
the OPLA and the Ohio Pure Food and Drug Act.76 Amazon prevailed in
its motion for summary judgment on these claims in the trial court, and
Mr. Stiner timely appealed to the Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals.77
The Ninth District noted that Mr. Stiner did not challenge that Amazon
was not the “manufacturer”78 of the product as that term is used in the
OPLA.79 Instead, Mr. Stiner asserted that Amazon, as a supplier of the
product, was required to assume liability in place of the absent
manufacturer.80 The OPLA imposes liability on the supplier of a
dangerous product, in the place of the actual manufacturer, in various
statutorily defined circumstances.81 Two such circumstances include
when the manufacturer is not subject to judicial process in Ohio82 or the
manufacturer is judgment proof.83 Mr. Stiner argued that either of these
provisions of the statute should apply to Amazon, because Amazon fit the
statutory definition of “supplier.”84
The OPLA defines supplier in both positive and negative terms.85 A
supplier is a person that “sells, distributes, leases, prepares, blends,
packages, labels, or otherwise participates in the placing of a product in

73. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 394 (Ohio 2020).
74. Id.; see also FDA Warns Consumers About Pure and Highly Concentrated Caffeine, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/dietary-supplement-productsingredients/fda-warns-consumers-about-pure-and-highly-concentrated-caffeine.
75. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 396.
76. Id. at 397.
77. Id.
78. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(B). Under the OLPA, manufacturer means “a person
engaged in a business to design, formulate, produce, make, create, construct, assemble, or rebuild a
product or a component of a product.”
79. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 120 N.E.3d 885, 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).
80. Id.
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN §2307.78(B)(1-8).
82. Id. at (B)(1)
83. Id. at (B)(2)
84. Stiner at 890.
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A).
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the stream of commerce.”86 A supplier is not a manufacturer, a seller of
real property, a provider of professional services who uses the product in
a way incidental to the sales transaction, or “any person who acts only in
a financial capacity with respect to the sale of the product.”87 The court
concluded there were no facts under which any part of that definition
could apply to Amazon and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment
ruling.88 Furthermore, because Amazon was not considered a supplier, the
court held that Mr. Stiner did not have standing to sue Amazon in place
of the absent manufacturer.89 After a second loss in Ohio’s Ninth District
Court of Appeals, Mr. Stiner appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The
justices initially declined to review the case but later accepted the appeal
upon reconsideration.90 The remainder of this Part closely examines the
Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in Stiner, along with the concurrence
by Justice Donnelly.
1. The Majority Opinion
In Stiner, the justices considered two questions limited exclusively to
Mr. Stiner’s product liability claims.91 The first question considered
whether Ohio courts must apply public policy considerations when an
internet provider, such as Amazon, acts in a capacity beyond that of a
neutral platform for third-party sales of deadly products.92 The second
question focused on determining whether Amazon participated in placing
the deadly caffeine-powder into the stream of commerce, such that it was
a “supplier” of the product.93
The court first considered whether Amazon fell under the definition of
“supplier” in the OPLA.94 Turning to the requisite statutory provision, the
justices applied the canon of ejusdem generis to determine its meaning.95
Directed by the canon, they reasoned the phrase “…otherwise participates
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at (A)(15)(b)(i)-(iv).
88. Stiner at 894.
89. Id.
90. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc. 125 N.E.3d 911 (Ohio 2019).
91. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 394, 397 (Ohio 2020).
92. Id. (the court further elaborated that such policy considerations included incentivizing safety
and shifting risk away from consumers in determining which entities should be deemed a supplier of a
product).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 398.
95. When interpreting legal texts, courts employ ejusdem generis where a statute includes a
catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration of specific items. The canon directs that when such a
convention is used by legal drafters, the meaning of the catchall phrase only applies to persons or things
of the same general class as those enumerated items. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 169 (2012).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 10

2022]

ALL OF THE PRODUCTS, NONE OF THE LIABILITY

1355

in the placing of a product in the stream of commerce” had to be read in
conjunction with the preceding list of phrases in R.C. 23071.71(A)(15).96
According to the majority, Amazon had not taken any action analogous
to selling, leasing, preparing, blending, packaging, or labeling the
caffeine-powder, meaning it had not participated in placing the product in
the stream of commerce and therefore was not a supplier under the
OPLA.97 The fact that it had otherwise been involved in the sales
transaction was insufficient to impose strict liability.98 The court cited the
Sixth Circuit’s holding in Fox for support, noting that Amazon had not
exercised a sufficient degree of control over the product at any point in
the transaction to fall under the OPLA’s definition of “seller.”99
After establishing that Amazon was not a supplier of the caffeinepowder, the justices considered whether products liability policy
objectives, derived from the common law, would otherwise justify
imposing liability on Amazon.100 The court reviewed its decision in
Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip., Inc. to determine what actions
constituted placing a product into the stream of commerce prior to the
passage of the OPLA.101 In Anderson, the Supreme Court of Ohio
assessed whether a company that had repaired an aerial device, which
later failed during use in a construction project, could be held liable under
the OPLA.102 The court concluded that the company could be liable, even
though they were neither the original manufacturer nor seller of the
device.103 Rather, the court found the company had negligently
refurbished the device, which was sufficient to establish that it had
participated in placing the product into the stream of commerce, and was
therefore strictly liable for any injuries attributable to the device’s
malfunctioning.104
The Stiner court ultimately declined to analogize the company’s
actions in Anderson to those of Amazon.105 The majority explained that
the Anderson court relied exclusively on the policy considerations in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine which parties were liable.
Conversely, Stiner was decided in light of the Ohio General Assembly’s
96. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 398.; see also Fraley v. Est. of Oeding, 6 N.E.3d 9 (Ohio 2014) (noting
that the court considers a catch-all phrase in a statute to only embrace things of a similar character as the
words preceding it).
97. Id. at 399.
98. Id. at 400.
99. Id. (citing Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2019)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626 (1991).
103. Id. at 629.
104. Id. at 630.
105. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 401.
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2005 amendments to the OPLA, which expressly abrogated all common
law product liability claims or causes of action and thereby limited the
court’s authority to find Amazon liable under the text of the statute.106
Therefore, whether Amazon was a “supplier” that had “otherwise
participat[ed] in the placing of a product in the stream of commerce” was
strictly a matter of statutory interpretation and discerning legislative
intent. As the justices already established, a close reading of the OPLA
precluded Amazon from incurring supplier-based liability.107
Further expanding upon their dismissal of the policy objectives of the
Restatement, the justices expressed their view that holding Amazon liable
for Logan Stiner’s death would not promote greater product safety.108
According to the court, because Amazon did not have a relationship with
the original manufacturer of the caffeine-power offered by Tenkoris, they
lacked control over product safety.109 While Amazon may be able to
influence product safety by removing unscrupulous third-party vendors’
listings from its online marketplace, the Ohio court was unconvinced that
alone empowered Amazon to prevent injuries caused by such products.110
Furthermore, the court reemphasized that Amazon never exercised a
requisite degree of control over the caffeine-powder such that it could
ensure its safety before it harmed Logan Stiner.111
In disposing of the remaining arguments advanced by Mr. Stiner, the
court ruled that Amazon’s status as a dominant retail company, best
positioned to compensate him for his son’s death, was irrelevant.112 Such
a public policy consideration, the court reasoned, was for the General
Assembly to address.113 The justices affirmed the Ninth District’s
holding, concluding the trial court had properly granted summary
judgment to Amazon on Mr. Stiner’s product liability claims.114
2. Justice Donnelly’s Concurrence
In the only opinion written separate from the majority’s, Justice
Donnelly reluctantly joined the court in its unanimous decision but
expressed reservations about its reasoning.115 Notably, he pointed out that
the OPLA was passed in the late 1980s, a time well before widespread
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
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internet use, much less modern day e-commerce.116 Letting Amazon
escape liability for injuries caused by products sold by its third-party
vendors, according to Justice Donnelly, frustrated the true purpose of
products liability law, leaving Ohio consumers at the mercy of distant
sellers that can easily make themselves unreachable for redress.117 The
true purpose of products liability law, Justice Donnelly opined, is to
protect consumers from harm, particularly to protect them from suffering
harm without legal recourse.118
Furthermore, Justice Donnelly argued that, even if Amazon was not a
seller as originally conceived by the drafters of the OPLA, Amazon’s allencompassing role in the sales transactions of third-party sellers placed it
squarely within the supply chain.119 Because of the limitations Amazon’s
BSA places on its vendors, Amazon will nearly always be the entity most
reachable by a customer for any matter, including products liability
claims.120 Additionally, Justice Donnelly asserted that because Amazon
is extensively involved in the chain of distribution leading to the
customer, it is especially well positioned to monitor its third-party
vendors.121 Just as brick-and-mortar retailers are in the best position to
select safer products from their wholesalers, Amazon is best positioned to
limit the availability of its marketplace to reputable third-party vendors
that sell safe products.122
Finally, Justice Donnelly faulted the majority for focusing solely on
what Amazon is not obligated to do under the OPLA, rather than what it
should be obligated to do to protect Ohio consumers.123 After advancing
these arguments, however, Justice Donnelly ultimately rested on the
central thesis of the majority: the Ohio General Assembly was the proper
116. Id. (Justice Donnelly further elaborated how Amazon acted as the face of the sale, published
information about the product, engaged with the customer at every point of the sale, and taken payment
from the customer. Such a distribution model was alien to the General Assembly that passed the OPLA).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 403; see also William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-23 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel]
(explaining one of the principal arguments for broadly imposing strict liability on sellers of dangerous
products:
The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the maximum possible protection
that the law can give against dangerous defects in products which consumers must buy, and against
which they are helpless to protect themselves; and it justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of
such products, of full responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the supplier has not been
negligent.)
119. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 403.
120. Id. at 404.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (“[T]he fact that the limited wording of the act leaves a gap that allows e-commerce entities
like Amazon to evade any obligation does not mean that there is a corresponding gap in the policy
underlying the law; it means the act is failing to fully realize its purpose”).
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body to address these public policy concerns; the meaning of the OPLA
could not be altered by judicial fiat.124
III. DISCUSSION
In concluding that Amazon is not a supplier under the OPLA, the
Supreme Court of Ohio joined the coalition of state and federal judges
unwilling to extend liability to the company for injuries caused by thirdparty vendor products sold on its online marketplace. By doing so, the
justices effectively placed Amazon, and other e-commerce platforms
engaged in facilitating third-party sales, beyond the statute’s reach. The
disinclination of the justices to consider the policy objectives of products
liability signaled that their decision will remain the status quo pending
further action by the Ohio General Assembly.125 In the meantime, Ohio
consumers are left to fend for themselves in the aftermath of injuries they
suffer from faulty products proliferated by Amazon’s third-party vendors,
lest they successfully hail those vendors into court.
Part A of this Section will demonstrate that the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s dismissal of common law products liability principles constituted
an abrupt departure from its traditional role adjudicating such claims. Part
B will compare the Supreme Court of Ohio’s approach in Stiner to the
California Second District Court of Appeals’ approach in Loomis. Part B
will further illustrate that judicial consideration of public policy
objectives is not only appropriate in the arena of products liability but
essential to protect consumers in a modern retail market increasingly
dominated by e-commerce platforms. Part C examines the Supreme Court
of Ohio’s invocation of ejusdem generis and proposes an alternative
canon of statutory interpretation that would allow the OPLA, in its current
form, to extend liability to Amazon for injuries caused by third-party
vendor products.
A. The Stiner Court’s Refusal to Account for Public Policy Objectives
Ran Counter to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Traditional Role in
Products Liability Law
While the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Stiner rested primarily
on statutory interpretation, the opinion still took an opportunity to argue
that the same result was required under common law principles predating
the statute.126 This conclusion, however, is dubious at best upon closer
124. Id.
125. Id. at 401.
126. Id. (“But even if we were to consider the policy objectives of products-liability law predating
the Act, Stiner has not demonstrated that holding Amazon liable would promote product safety”).
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inspection of those principles. In Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip., Inc.,
the Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly rejected that exchange of title
between seller and buyer was a prerequisite to establishing that a product
had been “sold.”127 In direct contrast to the Stiner court’s reasoning, the
Anderson court explained that such an overly technical construction of
“seller” or “supplier” would ignore the realities of modern business
transactions, which themselves are constantly evolving.128 The Anderson
court further noted that the objectives of strict products liability would be
defeated if they were forced to rely exclusively on technical definitions
of commercial sales transactions.129
In a critical contribution to strict products liability theory, Professor
William Prosser argued that American state courts should analogize the
roles played by traditional players in the consumer retail market with
those played by newer entrants.130 In an especially compelling section of
the article, Prosser described why wholesalers, a relatively new type of
retail business at the time of his publication, should incur liability for
injuries caused by the products sold to consumers by their downstream
vendors:
[A]ll of the valid arguments supporting strict liability—the public interest
in the utmost safety of products, the demand for the maximum protection
of the consumer, the implied assurance in placing the goods upon the
market for human use, the consumer's reliance upon the apparent safety of
a thing that he finds upon the market because the defendant has put it there,
the fact that the consumer is the seller's ultimate objective, the desirability
of avoiding circuity of action and allowing recovery directly against earlier
sellers—all of these apply with no less force against the wholesaler.131

Prosser further noted how, at that time, the large wholesaler was emerging
as the dominant force in bringing retail goods to consumers; there was no
valid reason for courts to single out one particular entity in the supply
chain as being removed from the purview of products liability law.132
By declaring itself constrained by its own interpretation of the OPLA,

127. Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ohio 1991).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 630 (quoting Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind.
1970)):
The rule is really one of liability to the seller for defective goods which the seller places in
commerce. A technical and complete sales transaction, while being a common and easily
recognizable commercial transaction, is not the only commercial transaction which comes within
the purview of the rule of ‘strict liability’. To limit the rule to only those situations in which there
has been an actual sale would be to circumscribe the rule to such an extent that its purpose might
be defeated.
130. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 118, at 1141-42.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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the Supreme Court of Ohio ignored both its historical role in developing
products liability doctrine as well as the central purposes underlying
products liability law, both to the detriment of Ohio consumers.
B. The Loomis Decision Provides Superior Reasoning for How to
Characterize Amazon’s Role in Facilitating Third-Party Vendor Sales
on its Marketplace
Although the Stiner court was correct in stating that Amazon did not
directly store, ship, or touch the caffeine-powder that killed Logan
Stiner,133 the majority’s insistence that Amazon did not exercise a
sufficient degree of control over the caffeine-powder to incur liability for
its deadly consequences is unconvincing. As the California Court of
Appeals explained in Loomis, Amazon exercises considerable control
over the transactions that occur on its online marketplace.134 As in Stiner,
the consumer in Loomis looked to Amazon to find the product he desired
to buy.135 Amazon took the order, processed the payment, transmitted the
order to the vendor, and collected a fee from the vendor and the
consumer.136 While Amazon characterized itself as an online mall
providing online storefronts for its vendors, this proposition hardly passes
logical muster. As the Loomis court explained, traditional malls do not
serve as middlemen for payment and communication in every single
transaction between buyers and storefront vendors, nor do they charge a
per-item fee for every product sold by those vendors.137 Rather, these
actions indicate that Amazon’s role in its third-party vendor sales are
significantly more analogous to a retailer of consumer goods than a
passive shopping mall owner.138
Building off this line of reasoning, the Loomis court presented a
functional approach to analyzing the extent of Amazon’s liability for
third-party vendor transactions: the stream of commerce theory of strict
liability.139 According to this approach:
[N]o precise legal relationship to the member of the enterprise causing the
defect to be manufactured or to the member most closely connected with
the customer is required before the courts will impose strict liability. It is
the defendant's participatory connection, for his personal profit or other
benefit, with the injury-producing product and with the enterprise that

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 394 (Ohio 2020).
.
Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II(B)(3).
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created consumer demand for and reliance upon the product (and not the
defendant's legal relationship (such as agency) with the manufacturer or
other entities involved in the manufacturing-marketing system) which calls
for imposition of strict liability.140

Under this standard, the Loomis court determined that Amazon could be
found liable for the sale of the hoverboard that caught fire in the plaintiff’s
home, notwithstanding the lack of direct physical interaction Amazon
employees had with the product.141
Most significantly, the Loomis court reasoned that whether Amazon
has a direct relationship with the upstream manufacturers of the products
sold by its third-party vendors is irrelevant to assessing its ability to
control the manufacturing process.142 As the judges noted, Amazon’s
BSA requires a manufacturer safety certification, indemnification
guarantees, and verification of liability insurance before permitting a
vendor to list a product on its marketplace, indicating that it actually
exerts substantial control over the manufacturing process.143
Applying this standard to Amazon’s role in the sale of the caffeinepowder that killed Logan Stiner, Amazon should be held liable. Amazon
received a direct financial benefit for the sale of the powder through
collection of its standard, per-item fee that it charges for every third-party
vendor sale.144 Additionally, Amazon played an integral role in bringing
Tenkoris products to the consumer market. Within two years of Amazon
removing caffeine-powder products from its website,145 Tenkoris sales
plummeted, and it eventually filed chapter 11 bankruptcy in Arizona.146
Finally, and in direct contradiction to the conclusion of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, Amazon’s BSA granted the company substantial control over the
caffeine powder’s manufacturing process. Notably, Tenkoris was
required to provide a manufacturer’s safety certification before its product
was permitted for sale on Amazon’s marketplace. The apparent lethality
of the powder demonstrates a lack of diligence by Amazon in adequately
assessing whether the product was indeed safe to sell to consumers.
Relying heavily on the decisions in Fox and Garber, the Stiner court
accorded much weight to Amazon being too far removed from the
manufacturing process to have sufficiently “controlled” the product.147
The majority’s concept of control, however, turned a blind eye to the
140. Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 780 (quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314,
323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
141. Id. at 781.
142. Id. at 780.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 394 (Ohio 2020).
146. In re Tenkoris, LLC, No. 16-07290 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2016).
147. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 401.
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realities of the modern retail market. As Justice Donnelly noted in his
concurrence, applying pre-internet era concepts of product control to one
of the most sophisticated product distribution systems in the retail world
is inequitable, if not altogether illogical.148
While the majority bogged itself down with technical, outdated
definitions of supplier, it ignored the inherently dangerous situation
created by Amazon allowing Tenkoris to list an unsafe, deadly product on
its marketplace. Anyone could have bought the product, and it found its
way to an Ohio consumer. According to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
however, that fact is a legal nullity under the current statutory regime.149
In the Stiner court’s view, Amazon is too far removed from third-party
vendor transactions to incur liability under the OPLA.150
C. The OPLA Allows for Adoption of the Stream of Commerce Approach
to Products Liability in its Current Form
While the Supreme Court of Ohio gave a cursory nod to the policy
arguments adopted by the California Second District, it rejected
Amazon’s role as a supplier through intensive reliance on statutory
interpretation.151 Applying the canon of ejusdem generis to the OPLA
definition of supplier, the justices deduced the catchall phrase
“…otherwise participates in the placing of a product in the stream of
commerce”152 to mean a person who plays an analogous role to a person
who sells, distributes, leases, prepares, blends, packages, or labels a
product.153 Amazon’s supposed lack of control over the caffeine-powder,
as the justices saw it, removed it from purview of the catchall phrase.154
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s arbitrary imposition of ejusdem generis
allowed for the decision’s logical leap that Amazon did not control the
sale of the caffeine-powder to such an extent that it “supplied” it. Yet, to
say that Amazon does not sufficiently control the sales process of thirdparty vendor products renders the statute’s catchall phrase virtually
148. Id. at 402 (Donnelly, J., concurring) (“The Act applies to a person with a role as minor as
placing a sticker on a product but not to a person that controls every single aspect of placing a product in
the stream of commerce except for transferring ownership or physically controlling the product. The Act
applies to a mom-and-pop retail store with a small, exclusively local customer base, but not to a business
that is responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of retail sales in Ohio. Indeed, the Act does
not address many of the contemporary standards in technology, communications, and commerce—
standards that have changed radically since 1988. The divide between the pre-Internet age and the current
age is so profound that laws like this Act might as well have been written in the stone age”).
149. Id. at 401.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 398.
152. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(15).
153. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 398.
154. Id.
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meaningless. To avoid this result, the justices could have used different
canons of statutory interpretation without rewriting the statute.
A superior reading of the OPLA definition of supplier would invoke
the surplusage canon: verba cum effectu sunt accipienda. This canon
provides that, if possible, every word and provision of a legal text should
be given meaningful effect, and none should be given an interpretation
that causes them to have no consequence.155 Employing this canon, the
Supreme Court of Ohio could have read the catchall phrase to account for
modern day e-commerce transactions that Amazon thoroughly dominates.
The statute, verbatim, references persons that participate in placing
products into the stream of commerce. The Stiner court was free to
interpret the OPLA as encompassing the same policy arguments espoused
by the Loomis court; Amazon does, in fact, participate in placing every
product bought and sold on its online marketplace into the stream of
commerce. To conclude that the Ohio General Assembly intended
otherwise “…thwarts the purpose of products liability law, because it puts
Amazon’s customers at risk of being injured by a seller that can easily
make itself unreachable for redress.”156 While the OPLA abrogates
common law causes of action, the common law can still inform the
meaning of the statute such that it accomplishes its central objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Amazon debate will almost certainly continue. Amazon is so large
and facilitates so many sales that consumers will inevitably continue to
suffer injuries from products sold on its marketplace. While different state
and federal courts continue to grapple with their understanding of
Amazon’s role in the modern retail market, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has left the state’s consumer base at the mercy of distant, practically nonexistent third-party vendors. Until the court changes course, or the
General Assembly amends the law, Ohio residents must shop on
Amazon’s marketplace at their own risk.

155. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 95, at 124. See also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 58 (1868) (“The courts must…lean in favor of a construction that will render every word operative,
rather than one which will make some idle and nugatory”).
156. Stiner, 164 N.E.3d at 402 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
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